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Abstract 
Customs Compliance and the Power of Imagination 
Kai A. Konrad, Tim Lohse and Salmai Qari* 
This paper studies the role of beliefs about own performance or appearance for 
compliance at the customs. In an experiment in which underreporting has a higher 
expected payoff than truthful reporting we find: a large share, about 15-20 percent of the 
subjects, is more compliant if they have reason to imagine that their performance 
influences their subjective audit probability. In contrast, we do not find evidence for 
individuals who believe that by their personal performance they can reduce the subjective 
probability for an audit. Our results suggest that the power of imagination, i.e. the role of 
second-order beliefs in the process of customs declarations is important and may 
potentially be used to improve customs and tax compliance. 
Keywords: Customs, tax compliance, audit probability, second-order beliefs 
JEL classification: H26, H31, C91
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caveat applies. 1. Introduction
In this paper we investigate compliance decisions at the customs. If customs ocers watch and
decide whom to inspect, this may not leave travelers unaected, particularly if they carry items
which they are supposed to declare. We are interested in the role of travelers' imagination, i.e.
their subjective beliefs about their own ability to inuence customs ocers. If the customs
ocer can choose whom to audit on the basis of the experience of personal interviews, travelers
may imagine how their own physical characteristics (height, eye-color, ethnic background),
their appearance (voice, looks, dress) and their eloquence will aect the customs ocer's audit
decision. Some individuals may feel that they have a low ability for deception. Other travelers
may think that they have strong abilities to deceive customs ocers, compared to the average
ability for deception within the overall group of travelers. If both types of beliefs exist in a
population of travelers, they work in opposite directions, and in the aggregate, this may cloud
the true eect of such second-order beliefs. Our experimental design allows us to measure these
eects separately.
Before designing the laboratory experiment, we conducted 17 interviews with customs of-
cers at three dierent German international airports.1 This served two purposes. First, it
led to a better understanding of the existing framework at the customs. Second, we were
interested in the self-perceptions of customs ocers, particularly regarding their beliefs about
the eectiveness of their audit policy. Key ndings from the interviews, which were conducted
2009 and 2010, that are relevant for our research question are as follows. (1) Sixteen out of
seventeen ocers agreed that compliance behavior is aected if travelers see customs ocers at
the customs gate, compared to a situation in which they do not see any customs ocer standing
nearby. Ocers reported about people getting nervous or turning red when just being watched
by an ocer. In case a traveler is chosen to be inspected, about half of the ocers stated
that they can tell right away whether or not the chosen traveler tried to smuggle some goods.
(2) The perception was prevalent that the mere presence of customs ocers induces a more
honest behavior. Two thirds of the ocers reported that their physical presence increased the
share of travelers who chose to declare something. This suggests to design the experiment in
such a way that we can separate the eects of second-order beliefs from the eect of a pure
face-to-face contact. (3) We asked ocers to rank three alternative institutional frameworks
according to which framework is most eective to induce honest behavior. These included the
voluntary self-selection of travelers into an exit for travelers who have\nothing to declare"and
an exit for travelers who have to make a declaration, a written and signed declaration form,
and verbal face-to-face customs declarations. About half of the ocers interviewed considered
1The customs ocers were encouraged by the customs administration to volunteer to these interviews. The
28 interview questions were raised by an interviewer and the (semi-open) answers were voice-recorded and
transcribed. These also included questions about the ocer's age, experience and position.
2verbal face-to-face declarations as most eective. (4) We nd that customs ocers have a large
degree of freedom in their choices about whom to audit and develop their own heuristics on
their job. This is important as it suggests that second-order beliefs have a legitimate place in
real compliance contexts; travelers may rightly believe that their characteristics and behavior
may aect their individual probability of being audited.
Our main ndings can be briey summarized as follows: Second-order beliefs about how
own appearance and performance aect the subjective probability of being audited do change
individuals' declaration decisions. In an environment in which the expected monetary payo
from cheating is positive (induced by a low penalty) the proportion of subjects who report
honestly is higher if individuals know that their individual audit probability depends on the
customs ocer's decision. The share of subjects who honestly declare and pay duties increases
roughly by 15-20 percentage points (compared to a purely random audit). In contrast, in an
environment that induces individuals to report honestly (high penalty) there are no treatment
eects. A large number of individuals seemingly believe that the customs ocer would detect
their dishonest declaration. In general, we can conclude that better compliance is induced if
the audit depends on individuals' behavior when talking to the customs ocer. These ndings
have policy relevance for the design of the set-up in which compliance decisions are made.
A framework with personal contact and with discretion about whom to audit can improve
compliance. This may hold not only for customs declarations but also for tax declarations and
other compliance frameworks.
The problem of tax compliance more generally has generated enormous interest among
economists.2 One branch of this literature considers tax compliance as an incentive prob-
lem. Seminal papers in this context are Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974),
Reinganum and Wilde (1985, 1986), and Chander and Wilde (1998). Apart from the purely
monetary incentives, other aspects have been considered as possible determinants of compli-
ance behavior. These include an intrinsic motivation (Frey 1997), an inclination for pro-social
behavior (Frey and Torgler 2007), fairness considerations (Hartner et al. 2008), religiosity
(Torgler 2006), and patriotism (Konrad and Qari 2011).3 Feldman and Slemrod (2007) and
especially Kleven et al. (2011), who analyze data from Danish tax authorities, nd evidence
that tax evasion is higher for self-reported income.4 A considerable amount of experimental
2Much of this literature assumes away the complexities of tax declarations and reduces the problem to a
compliance decision similar to the decision of travelers at the customs. Theory contributions focusing on
customs compliance more explicitly are Thursby et al. (1991), and Yaniv (2010).
3Andreoni et al. (1998) and Slemrod (2007) provide in-depth surveys of this large literature.
4Alm et al. (2010) object to what they call the traditional enforcement paradigm which considers taxpayers
as \potential criminals" (p. 577). They argue that it is rather the complexity and unclarity of tax schedules
that leads to an unintentionally high degree of tax evasion. Alm and co-authors base their argument on
experimental evidence that more service for taxpayers from the tax administration leads to more honest
behavior. Our setting focuses solely on self-reported income with an individual declaration situation that is
rather easy. Therefore, we are able to rule out complexity or unclarity as an explanatory factor for dishonest
3literature has analyzed the tax compliance decision in detail. Alm (2010, p. 654) reports
that a considerable share of these experimental eorts concentrated on variables such as the
probability of an audit, and the size of a penalty in case of misreporting that are related to
the material-rewards-oriented decision models on tax compliance. He also surveys the experi-
mental literature that considers social norms (e.g., groups' willingness to tolerate tax evasion,
attitudes vis- a-vis the government, country-specic eects), and the issue of simplicity versus
complexity. We consider the possible role of subjects' perceptions about whether they can
inuence the beliefs of others about their honesty in a compliance situation. We nd that such
second-order beliefs play a role, and this has implications for the optimal institutional design
of compliance situations.5
The underlying theory to our experimental analysis about the power of imagination has also
some links with the theory of beliefs about beliefs. For their compliance decision subjects need
to form a belief about the likelihood of being audited. In two of our treatments the audit
probabilities are known to be objective probabilities, and independent of individuals' behavior,
even though they have face-to-face contact with the customs ocer in one of the treatments.
In the third treatment, in which they have face-to-face contact with a customs ocer, this face-
to-face contact has an inuence on whether this subject is audited. Accordingly, their belief
about whether they will be audited is a belief about the customs ocer's belief, and about how
they may be able to aect this ocer's belief. We study these beliefs by studying the subjects'
actions, namely their compliance decision.6 Investigating the underlying reasons for changes in
behavior is a matter of psychological game theory as established by Geanakoplos et al. (1989)
for static models and Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) for dynamic models. From a behavioral
perspective, in this context a more compliant behavior can be driven by guilt aversion (Charness
and Dufwenberg 2006, among others), costs of lying (Vanberg 2008) or other traces of human
psychology. In our framework we do not study these micro-motives. Instead we focus on the
distinction between personal, face-to-face contact and a more anonymous declaration via the
computer, and for the case with face-to-face contact, between situations in which subjects
cannot aect their own probability of being audited, and situations in which they can aect
their own audit probability by their performance, keeping the aggregate audit probability
behavior. Any dishonest behavior in our setting is an intended strategic behavior based on second-order
beliefs.
5The process of belief formation in a signaling game need not stop short at second-order beliefs. However,
Arad and Rubinstein (2011) show that subjects generally do not use more than three steps of reasoning.
Hence, second-order beliefs are in fact of practical relevance for individual behavior.
6Note that we study a customs compliance situation in an environment that uses elements of a eld experiment.
In the course of the experiment, subjects have to walk to a neighboring room and talk to a customs ocer.
Since this procedure is very time-consuming we focus on subjects' actions as an outcome variable. This
approach of studying beliefs is in line with work by e.g. Weizs acker (2003) or Camerer et al. (2004). See
Manski and Neri (2011) and Costa-Gomes and Weizs acker (2008) for examples and discussion of the more
complex approach of eliciting beliefs via scoring rules.
4constant.7
In Section 2 we explain the theoretical model and the experimental design. In Section 3
we derive testable hypotheses. These are given a more formal underpinning in the Appendix.
Section 4 shows our ndings about the power of imagination. Section 5 concludes.
2. The theoretical and experimental setup
We consider the following compliance decision. A traveling person i has either a high endow-
ment (xH) or a low endowment (xL) of goods, with xL < xH, and the person knows what
this own endowment xi ∈ {xL,xH} is. Customs knows that xi is a random draw from the set
{xL,xH}, and that with probability 0.8 the person i has the high value xH, with probability 0.2
person i has the low value xL, that is, customs knows the distribution from which xi is drawn,
but cannot observe i's endowment directly. At the customs i must declare own endowment and
chooses between two possible reports: yi ∈ {h,l}. Customs receives this compliance report.
This report is followed by a process that either leads to an audit or not. We denote the two
alternatives ai ∈ {0,1}. For ai = 0 subject i can pass without audit, and for ai = 1 the subject
i receives an audit. The audit perfectly reveals the person's true endowment. The following
payos for person i are (exogenously) attached to the dierent combinations of actions for the
dierent endowments:
πi(xL,l,0) = πi(xL,l,1) = xL
πi(xL,h,0) = πi(xL,h,1) = xL − T
πi(xH,l,0) = xH
πi(xH,l,1) = xH − T − θ
πi(xH,h,0) = πi(xH,h,1) = xH − T
These payos conform with the intuitive outcomes: low-endowment persons pay no duties if
they report truthfully, regardless of whether they receive an audit. If, for whatever reason a
player reports a high endowment, the person has to pay a duty equal to T, also regardless
whether an audit occurs or not. Persons with high-endowment who report truthfully have
to pay a duty equal to T, regardless of whether they receive an audit. Persons with high-
endowment who declare a low endowment receive dierent payos dependent on whether they
receive an audit or not. If a person is not audited, no duty and no ne is to be paid. If a
high-endowment person who reported a low endowment receives an audit, the person has to
7We derive our testable hypotheses on the basis of utility-maximizing behavior. As the role of second-order
beliefs for compliance has not been analyzed yet, this paper will contribute to two out of Roth's three famous
categories of experiments (Roth 1995). First, starting from our hypotheses we are \searching for facts"
whether or not second-order beliefs induce strategic compliant behavior. And second, we are \whispering in
the ears of princes" with the policy implications of our experimental results.
5pay the duty T > 0, and, in addition, a surtax that is equal to θ > 0. Given this set-up, we
can safely assume that low-endowment persons who maximize their payo report truthfully.
A risk-neutral high-endowment person i who maximizes own expected monetary payo prefers
to report truthfully if
xH − T > pi(xH − T − θ) + (1 − pi)xH,
where pi is the probability that i attributes to being audited in case of declaring l.8 A person






Much of the further analysis is aected by how pi is determined. Inspired by the insights from
our survey among real customs ocers, we consider three dierent treatments. Throughout
all treatments, care is taken that players do not exchange views, and do not learn about other
subjects' monetary payos in the end of the experiment when payments are made.
In the fully computerized baseline treatment (T1) the person i learns the value of own
endowment while sitting in front of a computer. The person is then asked on the computer
screen whether to declare high or low endowment: yi ∈ {h,l}. More specically, we ask
whether i has to declare a high endowment. The person knows (as this is written down as
part of the instructions) that the computer chooses pi ≡ 0.5 if yi = l. The subjects make these
decisions in a laboratory room in which 20 subjects perform the same task. But as pi ≡ 0.5
is given exogenously, each subject's task is formally independent of the tasks and choices of
other subjects. In T1, for pi ≡ 0.5, the indierence condition (1) reduces to T = θ. The
own-material-interest prediction is that a subject should choose yi = l if T > θ and yi = h if
T < θ.
In treatment T2, the subjects rst learn their endowment while sitting in front of a computer
in the same laboratory room as in T1. The 20 subjects waited until they were asked sequentially
to walk into one out of two separate neighboring rooms. The sequencing of subjects was
determined randomly.9 In each of the two rooms a customs ocer waited for subjects and saw
the identication number of the subject entering on a computer screen.10 The customs ocer
8Rabin (2000) shows that, within the expected-utility framework, anything but risk neutrality over modest
stakes would imply rather unrealistic risk aversion over large stakes. In our empirical analysis we generate a
risk measure by using data from a standard risk elicitation game in the style of Holt and Laury (2002) which
participating subjects had to play. This risk measure does not have explanatory power in our data (see also
below for details).
9By design the experiment precluded subjects from meeting each other during the compliance procedure or
from inferring preceded or succeeded them in their room. All players not currently active in complying saw
the request \please wait" on their screen in the room with the terminals in the laboratory room. This room
has several doors. People were asked to leave the room and return via separate doors. Jointly with the
instructions participants had received a map showing the position of the two rooms in question, and signs
directed them also to the respective rooms.
10To facilitate the comparison of the compliance behavior across treatments, the communication between the
6rst conrmed the entrant's identication number. Then, the subject had to report yi, that
is, whether he or she had something to declare. The ocer entered the subject's report in the
computer. The subject returned to the laboratory room. The rst round was over after ten
subjects had reported to one ocer and the other ten subjects to the other ocer. The ocer
in one room was female, the other ocer was male, in each round. Also in T2 the person
knows (as this is written as part of the instructions) that pi ≡ 0.5, and independent of the
person's (or other persons') general appearance or performance, i.e. the customs ocer has no
active decision role. This treatment takes into account that it may make a dierence if persons
have to report to a person rather than to a machine, as their subjective cost of misreporting
need not be the same in both situations.11 Therefore, we conducted the control treatment T2
in which compliance behavior dierent than in T1 can be traced back to a pure face-to-face
eect.
A third treatment T3 is similar in structure to treatment T2. The only dierence is how pi
is determined. In T3, subjects know that pi is not exogenous. Instead, the customs ocer has
to assess all subjects and their declarations. The ocer ranks these subjects according to his
beliefs about whether they are cheaters.12 This ranking enters into a procedure that determines
the subjects who receive an audit, increasing the likelihood for an audit for subjects whom the
ocer considers more likely to be dishonest, and decreasing the likelihood for an audit for
subjects whom the ocer considers to be more likely to be honest. We construct a method
by which these assessments enter into the audit decision, but by which, in the aggregate,
precisely half of the subjects of type (xH,l) receive an audit (see the Appendix for details).
This procedure ensures that the aggregate audit probability is constant across treatments for
all potential cheaters thereby removing a potential confounder of the treatment eects. These
rules are common knowledge. Consider now a subject i; the subjective audit probability pi is
lower than 0.5 if subject i expects to be assessed as being more likely to be honest than the
median among all other subjects who choose to underreport, and pi is higher than 0.5 if the
subject i expects to be assessed as being less likely to be honest than the median among all
other subjects who choose to underreport. Subjects must therefore form a belief about how
their appearance and performance aects the beliefs of the customs ocer. Subjects consider
their audit probability to be lower than the audit rate of 0.5 that holds in the aggregate if they
customs ocer and the subjects has to be standardized. More important, it is necessary to ensure anonymity
for the subjects. For these reasons, customs ocers were not recruited from the pool of student subjects.
Instead, young employees and contract workers from the Max Planck Institute played the role of customs
ocers.
11See, for instance, Lundquist et al. (2009) for some evidence that individuals dislike lying, particularly in
free-form communication. Also, work by Coricelli et al. (2010) suggests that emotional cost of cheaters being
caught is higher if cheating is made public.
12Grades ranged from 1 (=very credible) to 10 (=not credible at all). The audit mechanism made use of these
grades.
7believe that the ocer believes them to be honest more than he believes other untruthfully
reporting subjects to be honest. Their second-order beliefs may lead them to comply less
truthfully in T3 than in T1 and T2. We will refer to this kind of subjects as condent or
\strong" liars. In contrast, subjects who believe that the customs ocer is more likely to rate
them as a liar than other underreporting subjects, have a subjective audit probability pi that is
higher than 0.5. For these individuals their second-order beliefs can result in a more compliant
behavior in T3 than in T1 or T2. Individuals of this type will be called incondent, or\weak"
liars.
Note that the simultaneous presence of weak and strong liars causes a problem for identifying
the treatment eect between T2 and T3. Weak liars can be expected to show higher compliance
in T3 in comparison to T2. Strong liars can be expected to be less compliant in T3 than they
are in T2. The presence of two groups of equal size would then cause deviations among the
strong and the weak liars that may lead to very similar aggregate behavior in T2 and T3. In
order to address this problem, we conducted all treatments for two dierent parameter settings.
One of the settings was chosen to elicit and measure the dierence in behavior of strong liars
between T2 and T3. The second setting was chosen to elicit and measure the dierence in
behavior of weak liars between T2 and T3. We explain this further below in more detail.
We conducted the experiment in the Munich Experimental Laboratory for Economic and
Social Sciences (MELESSA) in 2011. A number of twelve sessions took place. The subjects were
students of diverse elds at the University of Munich.13 In each session there were 20 subjects,
totaling a number of 240 subjects who participated in the role as travelers. Each session
started with a reading of the instructions, which were also distributed in written format. Then
the subjects had to go through an introductory computerized quiz which took them about 10
minutes. The quiz outlined each possible payo situation of the upcoming experiment. The
participants had to calculate the resulting monetary payo in each of the situations. They
could only move on with the quiz if their answer was correct. In this way we ensured that the
participants fully understood the nature of the experiment, especially the audit mechanism.
Then the actual experiment started. Each individual participated only in one of the treatments.
Participants in T1 played the compliance game for ten independent rounds. Since each round
in treatments T2 and T3 takes more time than a round in T1, participants in T2 and in
T3 played exactly four independent rounds. Independence was induced by a replacement of
the person who served as the customs ocer between the rounds. After the experiment, the
subjects had to answer a questionnaire. We asked them for their gender, their eld of study,
etc. This quiz was followed by a standard risk elicitation game in the style of Holt and Laury
(2002). Participants were asked to compare ten pairs of lotteries sequentially. This game also
13The participants were recruited using the software ORSEE (Greiner 2004).
8took about ten minutes and the participants were able to generate additional income since in
the end the computer selected one of the ten situations and simulated the chosen lottery. In
the end they received their earnings from the experiment plus the outcome of that lottery, plus
a show-up fee of 4 euros.
Whereas customs ocers, in line with reality, were paid at, subjects participating in the
compliance game generated their earnings as follows. At the beginning of each round of the
experiment the subjects were sitting in front of their computer in the MELESSA experimental
laboratory room. The value of the goods to be imported by them (their \endowment") was
determined and displayed to them on their screens. The value was private information and it
was either high (with xH = 1000) or low (with xL = 400). Then, each subject chose whether to
report h(high) or l(low). If they reported yi = h, they had to pay customs duties of T = 200.
If a subject with a high value reported l and was audited, the subject had to pay customs
duties of T = 200 plus a ne θ. For θ we used two dierent parameter settings. In half of all
sessions the ne was equal to θ = 100, in the other half of the sessions the ne was equal to
θ = 300. The audits were carried out by the computer and if an audit took place, the true
value of xi was found. Subjects learned whether they received an audit at the end of each
round, and the resulting monetary payo was shown to them on the computer screen. The
participants' earnings from the experiment consisted of the outcome of one specic round that
was randomly drawn by the computer. The currency in the laboratory was named talers.14
3. Hypotheses
The experiment addresses the role of individuals' subjective beliefs about their own ability to
inuence customs ocers. Such beliefs can be formed in a compliance situation with direct face-
to-face communication with customs ocers who have an inuence on who receives an audit.
In a fully anonymous, computerized compliance framework with exogenous audit probability
such beliefs cannot play a role. We test whether there are subjects who think that they are
\weak liars" who would not declare truthfully in T1 or T2, but prefer to declare truthfully in
an environment such as T3, and whether there are subjects who think that they are \strong
liars", who would declare truthfully in T1 or T2, but prefer to declare untruthfully in an
environment such as T3. The treatment T2 serves as a control treatment since it captures
changes in compliance behavior that only arise because individuals are now required to make
their declaration decision in a face-to-face situation, with the audit mechanism remaining the
same as in T1.
14In the treatment T1, 1000 talers were converted into 10 euros. In T2 and T3, 1000 talers were converted into
15 euros. With these dierent exchange rates we ensured that the participants' expected payos per unit
of time they contributed were the same if they showed the same choice behavior in all treatments since the
sessions with the treatments T2 and T3 lasted longer.
9Consider the indierence condition (1) for θ for players who are motivated by their monetary
payos. This condition yields the prediction that all players with xi = 1000 declare honestly
for θ = 300, whereas all players with xi = 1000 declare yi = l for θ = 100, for both treatments
T1 and T2. The dierence in punishment size should have qualitatively a similar eect in
T3. In the experiment, we expect that other idiosyncratic factors may also play a role in an
individual's compliance decision. We do therefore not expect these predictions to materialize
sharply. However, we would expect that, among the subjects with xi = 1000, the share of
subjects who declare honestly is higher for θ = 300 than for θ = 100.15 These high-ne and
low-ne treatments constitute the benchmark case that is to be compared with a treatment
T3 with high nes and with low nes.
Before turning to the comparison of the baseline treatment with T3, we test for the role of
face-to-face contact of the compliance decision. For players who are motivated by the monetary
payos, the declaration mode (face-to-face or automated) should not matter, as long as the
audit probability is unaected. We formulate this as an auxiliary hypothesis: There is no
treatment eect between T1 and T2 for subjects with xi = 1000. This hypothesis is derived
more formally in the appendix as Proposition 1. It is auxiliary to what we do, as it paves the
ground for our main research question.16
We formally develop our central hypotheses for a comparison between T1 and T3 in the
Appendix. The hypotheses follow directly from the characterization of the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium in Proposition 2 in this appendix. The formal framework assumes that individuals
dier in exogenous appearance characteristics. We aggregate these characteristics in what we
label a subject's look of being honest. We do not consider what this look means precisely,
and whether this is an objective feature that somehow forces the subject to be more honest in
equilibrium than others, or whether this quality exists only in the imagination of the subjects.
Suppose that subjects cannot alter their own look, and that this look is the quasi automated
15This comparison also tests whether the standard theory results on the eectiveness of higher nes hold in our
framework. But this test is not central to our research question. Given the considerable evidence on earlier
tax compliance experiments, we expected that the size of the ne matters, as has been shown in a number
of other experiments.
16Nevertheless, it was unclear ex-ante whether this hypothesis holds. Given the behavioral literature on individ-
uals' attitudes toward lying under a variety of conditions (Lundquist et al. 2009), a competing (behavioral)
hypothesis suggests that the share of subjects with xi = 1000 who declare honestly is higher in T2. Several
reasons for such an alternative outcome could be considered. For instance, the possible cost of lying may
be higher if lying occurs in a situation with face-to-face contact. Also, subjects may be too much used to
the idea that the information generated by face-to-face contact is used for determining the individual audit
probability. They may be unable to abstract completely from this eect in their decision-making even in
a situation in which, objectively speaking, face-to-face contact has no eect on their probability of being
audited. If the compliance behavior changed substantially between T1 and T2, this would suggest that a
change in the compliance behavior from T1 and T3 is driven by a mixture of a mere face-to-face eect. If
that is the case, the pure eect of second-order beliefs is captured by the dierence between T2 and T3. If,
however, the change in compliance behavior between T1 and T2 is small, this implies that the dierence in
behavior from T1 to T3 can be mostly attributed to the eect of second-order beliefs.
10basis for selecting subjects for an audit. If all subjects have a precise idea about whether
they have an\honest look"or a\dishonest look", and have prior beliefs about the distribution
of these looks in the subject pool, they form conjectures regarding whether subjects with a
certain look report truthfully or underreport. This translates into a distribution of looks in
the subset of players who actually underreport. By construction, the customs ocer does
not consistently solve for an equilibrium, but simply sorts subjects according to their looks
and half of the subjects in this subset are automatically subject to an audit. This half is, by
construction, the less-honest-looking half in the eyes of the customs ocer.17
For the numerical case with high nes (xH = 1000;T = 200;θ = 300), the critical level of
pi for which i is indierent about whether to report truthfully is pi = 2/5 by condition (1).
Accordingly, the equilibrium prediction for material-payo-motivated subjects is that some
(particularly honest-looking) subjects will underreport in the treatment T3 with high nes,
whereas, for the same high nes, the prediction for T1 and T2 was that no subject should
underreport for this parameter range. This yields our rst main hypothesis.
Hypothesis A: For θ = 300, the share of players xi = xH who declare honestly in T3 is
smaller than in T1 or T2.
For the numerical case in the experimental setting of T3 with low nes (xH = 1000;T =
200;θ = 100), the critical level of pi for which the subject is indierent about reporting truth-
fully or not is pi = 2/3 by condition (1). Accordingly, the equilibrium prediction for material-
payo-motivated subjects is that some (particularly dishonest-looking) subjects will report
truthfully in the treatment T3 with low nes, whereas, for the same low nes, the prediction
for T1 and T2 was that no material-payo-motivated subject should report truthfully for this
level of nes. This yields our second main hypothesis.
Hypothesis B: For θ = 100, the share of players with xi = xH who declare honestly in T3
is larger than in T1 or T2.
Hypotheses A and B establish our main testable hypotheses about possible compliance-
decreasing eects and compliance-increasing eects of second-order beliefs in the two penalty
regimes, respectively. We now turn to the data and results.
4. Results
In this section we analyze subjects' aggregate behavior across treatments using dierent econo-
metric models. We rst describe briey the characteristics of our sample and the associated
17We instructed the customs ocers to \assess all subjects" and to \grade the honesty of their declarations"
at the end of the round. Since each ocer met each traveler just once, those two assessments are likely to
coincide in practice.
11empirical strategy. We then estimate treatment eects according to the between-subjects de-
sign outlined in the previous section.
4.1. Sample Characteristics and Empirical Strategy
As described in section 2, each participant in T1 played ten rounds, while the number of rounds
equals four in T2 and T3. Each treatment is carried out twice for both setups with respect to
the penalty. In the rst setup we have T > θ such that dishonest behavior is induced, while
the second setup (T < θ) induces incentives to honestly report a high endowment. Since there
are 20 participants in each session, there are in total 80 subjects and 800 observations from T1,
while there are 160 subjects with corresponding 640 observations from T2 and T3. Note that
subjects were assigned their endowment in each round randomly with replacement. Hence, the
number of low- and high-endowment observations respectively is not xed ex-ante.18
Table 1 provides a rst summary of the sample characteristics. For the data analysis the
reporting variable yit is coded as follows: yit is equal to 0 if subject i in period t reports a low
endowment and equal to 1 if subject i reports a high endowment. The upper panel tabulates
the number of low-endowment reports (yit=0) by treatment and true endowment xit, and the
lower panel tabulates the high-endowment reports. As discussed earlier, subjects are never
Table 1: Reporting behavior by true endowment
Declaration yit Treatment true endowment xit
400 1000
0 (yit = l) T1 158 341
0 (yit = l) T2 64 106
0 (yit = l) T3 60 92
1 (yit = h) T1 3 298
1 (yit = h) T2 0 150
1 (yit = h) T3 0 168
expected to report a high endowment when their true endowment is low. As shown in the
table, there are only 3 observations that t into this category. Hence, this provides a rst
indication that the subjects understood the rules of the game correctly. Recall that the low-
endowment observations are only used to generate a meaningful experimental setup. For the
evaluation of our main hypotheses we do not need these observations. We therefore analyze in
the following only high endowment observations (where xit = 1000).
We ask whether the compliance rate varies systematically across treatments. Our basic
18Due to the large number of observations, the fraction of low endowment observations is very close to 20%
overall and in each treatment as well. The largest deviation from 20% occurs in T3, where the fraction of
low endowment observations equals 0.1875.
12regression equation reads
yit = Ξ0
itβ + ui + it (2)
where the binary variable yit is equal to one if subject i who has high endowment in round t
truthfully reports this endowment. The main explanatory variables collected in Ξ0
it are a series
of dummy variables indicating the treatment in which subject i participated. The subject-
specic error term ui controls for the repeated measurement of each subject. We employ linear
and logistic mixed eects models (multi-level models) to t equation (2).
Note that the sample is unbalanced in two respects. First, subjects in T1 play 10 rounds,
while subjects in T2 and T3 play 4 rounds. Second, the number of high-endowment observa-
tions diers across subjects. As the probability for having a high endowment equals 80%, most
subjects in T2 and T3 obtained a high endowment in at least three rounds. This implies that
most subjects are observed either three or four times in those treatments and a few subjects are
observed once or twice. We therefore use the well-established parametric approach to handle
such sampling conditions and employ linear and nonlinear (logistic) mixed eects models (e.g.
Agresti 2003, Wooldridge 2006, Cameron and Miller 2009). The term \mixed eects model"
refers to the fact that both xed and random eects are estimated.19
We mainly present the results from a linear mixed model that essentially ignores that the
explained variable is binary. However, a linear model is a useful starting point as the estimates
are easy to interpret and are often in line with the results from probit and logit models. The
robustness section presents the results from a corresponding logistic model (which takes into
account that the explained variable is binary) that closely resemble the results from the linear
model.
4.2. Treatment Eects
Table 2 and Figure 1 present the aggregate compliance rate by Treatment and penalty. Starting
Table 2: Share of high-endowment reports (among high-endowment cases)
Treatment
Penalty 1 2 3 N
Low (T > θ) .28 .35 .52 575
High (T < θ) .65 .80 .77 580
N 639 256 260 1150
19While rank-based methods are well developed and known to be very ecient for the case of independent
balanced data, there is no well-established procedure for the case of unbalanced data involving clusters due
to the repeated measurement of the same subjects. A common remedy is to reduce the dataset by calculating
the average response for each subject. Unlike the raw data, the averages are independent and do not follow a
dichotomous distribution. However, since the number of observations entering the respective averages varies
across the sample, using a Wilcoxon rank-sum test is likely to generate test statistics of improper size (e.g.

























Figure 1: Reporting by Treatment and penalty
the discussion with the low penalty setup (T > θ), we nd that the compliance rates in the
rst two treatments are very similar. The fraction of truthful reports is roughly 28% in T1
and 35% in T2. By contrast, the fraction of honest reports is close to 52% in T3. This
suggests that the inuence of mere face-to-face contact is much smaller than the eect of
the endogenous subjective audit probability. This evidence is in line with hypothesis B: For
θ = 100 the compliance rate in T3 is substantially larger than in T1 and T2, i.e. there
is evidence of a compliance increasing eect driven by subjects' imagination with respect to
their audit probability. Turning to the high-penalty setup (T < θ), no clear pattern emerges.
Compared to the compliance rate in T1 (65%), the share of honest reports is higher in T2 than
in T1, although the audit probability is constant across these two treatments. Furthermore,
unlike in the low-penalty case, the compliance rate in T2 is seemingly the same as in T3. In
summary, the descriptive evidence provides support for Hypothesis B while there is no support
for Hypothesis A.
We now move to the econometric evidence and start with a linear probability model. To
this end, we t equation (2) by maximum likelihood assuming that both ui and it follow
a normal distribution.20 Tables 3 and 4 summarize the results for the low- and high-penalty
setup, respectively. The rst column presents the results for the full model including treatment
dummies and individual random eects, while the second column estimates a reduced model
omitting the treatment dummies. We discuss the reduced model in more detail below.
Overall, the estimates presented in the two tables conrm the descriptive evidence. In the
low-penalty case (Table 3), the fraction of truthful reports in T1 equals 28%. Compared to
20We use the R environment (R Development Core Team 2009) and in particular the lme4 package (Bates and
Maechler 2009) to t the model.
14Table 3: Linear Unobserved Eects Model for θ = 100 (low penalty)
(1) (2)
(Intercept) 0.28 (0.06) 0.38 (0.04)
Treatment2 0.08 (0.08)
Treatment3 0.23 (0.08)
Log likelihood -289.90 -293.69
AIC 589.81 593.38
Likelihood Ratio 7.569 (p=0.0223)
Observations: 575, groups: 120
Standard errors in parentheses.
The table presents the results from a linear probability model where the binary variable yit (report) is
predicted by a set of treatment xed eects (dummy variables) and a random intercept for each subject.
The omitted reference category in column (1) is Treatment 1. Column (2) presents the results from a more
parsimonious model where yit depends only on the subject-specic random eect and an intercept.
T1, the compliance rate in the intermediate treatment T2 is eight percentage points higher.
However, the associated standard error of 0.08 reveals that this dierence is not precisely
estimated. The compliance rate in T3 is 23 percentage points higher compared to T1, yielding
a total compliance of 51%. The intermediate treatment T2 captures the eect of mere face-to-
face contact while holding the monetary incentives constant, and hence the pure face-to-face
eect seems to be rather small for the low-penalty setup. In turn, this suggests that the increase
in tax compliance in T3 is driven by individuals' imagination with respect to their own audit
probability. To summarize our results so far, the evidence in the low-penalty setup is in line
with Hypothesis B and the auxiliary hypothesis of no treatment eect between T1 and T2.
Table 4: Linear Unobserved Eects Model for θ = 300 (high penalty)
(1) (2)
(Intercept) 0.65 (0.05) 0.73 (0.03)
Treatment2 0.14 (0.08)
Treatment3 0.12 (0.08)
Log likelihood -259.20 -261.09
AIC 528.40 528.18
Likelihood Ratio 3.7797 (p=0.1511)
Observations: 580, groups: 120
Standard errors in parentheses.
The table presents the results from a linear probability model where the binary variable yit (report) is
predicted by a set of treatment xed eects (dummy variables) and a random intercept for each subject.
The omitted reference category in column (1) is Treatment 1. Column (2) presents the results from a more
parsimonious model where yit depends only on the subject-specic random eect and an intercept.
The regression results for the high-penalty setup (Table 4) also resemble the descriptive
15evidence. The compliance rate in T1 is roughly 65% and it is around 12-14 percentage points
higher in T2 and T3.
We can assess the explanatory power of the treatment dummies by comparing the model
to a model including only an intercept and the random eects. Formally, the equation of the
more parsimonious model reads yit = b + ui + it. The model is nested in the previous model
allowing a likelihood-based comparison of both models. In the high penalty setup, the Akaike
information criterion (AIC) of the model including treatment eects is equal to 528.40 (see
Table 4, column (1)) and exceeds the corresponding value of the more parsimonious model.
Hence, the more parsimonious model is preferred. By contrast, in the low-penalty setup the
model including treatment dummies (AIC 589.81, see Table 3, column (1)) is preferred over the
more parsimonious model (AIC 593.38, column (2)). A comparison of the associated likelihood
ratios supports the same conclusions. Summarizing, the preferred model in the high-penalty
case is a model without treatment dummies and an average compliance rate of approximately




This section inquires the robustness of the estimated treatment eects in a number of ways.
First, we check whether the use of a linear probability model has produced biased coecients.
We use the common approach for binary response variables and consider logistic models. Note
that there are two main approaches for estimating such models. The rst approach is a
generalized linear mixed model assuming that the subject-specic error term follows a normal
distribution. This model produces coecients that are suitable for predicting the probability
of the binary compliance variable conditional on the random intercept ui. For this reason, it is
sometimes referred to as the \subject-specic-model", especially in the biostatistics literature
(see, for example, Agresti 2003). In the economics literature, this model is usually referred to
as \random eects logit model" (e.g. Wooldridge 2010, Chapter 15). Unconditional marginal
eects (\population-averaged eects") can be obtained by integrating over the distribution of
the estimated subject-specic random eect.
The second approach treats the unobserved heterogeneity as nuisance parameters and models
directly the marginal mean (population mean) of the response variable. In our case, both
approaches produce the same evidence with respect to the marginal (population-averaged)
eects. The marginal eects are the quantities of interest, as our experiment is designed to
exploit between-subject variation rather than within-subject variation. We therefore present
16only the results from the marginal model.21
4.3.2. Baseline Results
The rst column of Table 5 and Table 6 summarizes the baseline results, where the probability
Table 5: Marginal Logistic Unobserved Eects Models (low penalty)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Intercept) -0.943 -0.883 -0.545 -1.123 -1.301
(0.124) (0.152) (0.253) (0.200) (0.319)
Treatment2 0.345 0.325 0.114 0.342 0.360
(0.225) (0.226) (0.255) (0.227) (0.229)
Treatment3 1.035 1.034 0.825 1.031 1.039
(0.215) (0.215) (0.243) (0.216) (0.217)
RiskMeasure 0.0407 0.0390 0.0430 0.0390
(0.0476) (0.0477) (0.0474) (0.0478)








Observations: 575, groups: 120
Standard errors in parentheses.
The table presents the results from a marginal logistic unobserved eects model where the binary variable
yit (report) is predicted by a set of treatment dummies and control variables (xed eects). The subject-
specic error terms are treated as nuisance. The omitted reference category is Treatment 1. The model is
tted using generalized estimating equations (GEE).
of reporting truthfully a high endowment is predicted by a subject-specic error term and a
set of treatment dummies. The estimated coecients are comparable to the linear probability
model from the previous section. For example, the predicted compliance rate in Treatment 1 for
the low-penalty case is given by Λ(−0.943) = 0.28 where Λ(·) denotes the inverse logit function.
The respective calculations for the other treatments show that the estimated treatment eects
for T2 and T3 are 0.07 and 0.23 respectively. Hence, the estimates are very close to the results
from the linear model. The same holds for the high-penalty case (Table 6, column 1).
4.3.3. Variation over time and risk attitudes
Figures 2 and 3 depict the compliance rate in each round averaging over subjects for the low-
21The marginal model is tted using generalized estimation equations (GEE).
17Table 6: Marginal Logistic Unobserved Eects Models (high penalty)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Intercept) 0.637 0.807 1.091 0.804 0.199
(0.118) (0.156) (0.258) (0.200) (0.302)
Treatment2 0.768 0.577 0.362 0.577 0.625
(0.249) (0.256) (0.284) (0.257) (0.259)
Treatment3 0.567 0.564 0.354 0.565 0.627
(0.239) (0.243) (0.273) (0.244) (0.248)
RiskMeasure 0.238 0.240 0.238 0.249
(0.0527) (0.0529) (0.0532) (0.0537)








Observations: 580, groups: 120
Standard errors in parentheses.
The table presents the results from a marginal logistic unobserved eects model where the binary variable
yit (report) is predicted by a set of treatment dummies and control variables (xed eects). The subject-
specic error terms are treated as nuisance. The omitted reference category is Treatment 1. The model is
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Figure 2: Reporting behavior among high-endowment cases for Treatments T1 (black), T2 
(dotted) and T3 (dashed) for θ = 100. Note that the fully computerized treatment T1 had 10 
rounds whereas the treatments T2 and T3 with personal interviews had only four rounds, but 
each of the rounds in T2 and T3 took more time and probably had more salience, so that the 
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Figure 3: Reporting behavior among high-endowment cases for Treatments T1 (black), T2 
(dotted) and T3 (dashed) for θ = 300. Note that the fully computerized treatment T1 had 10 
rounds whereas the treatments T2 and T3 with personal interviews had only four rounds, but 
each of the rounds in T2 and T3 took more time and probably had more salience, so that the 
learning effects from the first to the last round in the different treatments may nevertheless be 
comparable. 
 
Figure 3: Reporting by Treatment and rounds (high penalty)
and high-penalty setup respectively. Especially for the latter case, there is some evidence that
the compliance rate decreases in later periods. To facilitate a comparison across the treatments,
column (2) of Tables 5 and 6 respectively enters a dummy variable indicating the second half
of the game into the regression. We also introduce the individual measure of risk aversion into
the model.
The estimated treatment eects in the low-penalty setup (Table 5) are robust to the inclusion
of these additional controls. Moreover, the coecient for the risk measure is quite small and
the estimated time eect obtains a large standard error. Hence, both additional controls have
no predictive power in the low-penalty case. The risk coecient in the high-penalty setup
(Table 6) obtains a value of 0.238. As expected from the gures, the estimated time coecient
is larger compared to the low-penalty case. However, the associated standard error is rather
large.
Column (3) of the two tables considers a linear time trend instead of the dummy variable.
Note that the coecient in this specication is driven mainly by T1 since high values for
this variable only apply in the rst treatment. This approach lowers the estimated treatment
coecients in both the low- and high-penalty setups. However, the qualitative evidence remains
the same.
204.3.4. Extended set of control variables
Column (4) and (5) of tables 5 and 6 introduce a gender dummy and an age eect, respectively,
as additional control variables. The gender coecient in the low-penalty setup (Table 5) obtains
values around 0.364. This is a sizable eect comparable to an increase in the compliance rate
of seven percentage points. However, the standard error of 0.192 indicates that the precision
of this estimate is rather poor. The age coecient (column 5) is also noisy and small. In the
high-penalty setup (Table 6) the gender and the age coecients are small and imprecise. More
important, the results obtained so far are robust in both penalty setups.
4.3.5. Using T2 as the reference treatment
Note that all econometric models presented so far employed T1 as the reference treatment.
However, one might interpret T1 and T3 as variations of T2, which therefore could be alterna-
tively considered as the reference treatment. While the dierence between T2 and T1 is readily
available in Tables 5 and 6 respectively, there is no direct estimate for the dierence between
T3 and T2. We therefore run a marginal logit model where the linear predictor is transformed
to reect the dierence between adjacent treatments.
Table 7 summarizes the results. The rst column shows the coecients for θ = 100. The
Table 7: Marginal Logistic Unobserved Eects Model { dierence contrasts
(1) (2)








Standard errors in parentheses.
The table presents the results from a marginal logistic unobserved eects model where the binary variable yit
(report) is predicted by a set of treatment dummies and control variables (xed eects). The subject-specic
error terms are treated as nuisance. The coecients show the dierence between adjacent treatments. The
model is tted using generalized estimating equations (GEE).
standard error for the dierence between T2 and T1 is fairly large. This suggests that the small
dierence in the average compliance rate between T2 and T1 (eight percentage points) might
be attributed to sampling error. By contrast, the coecient for the dierence between T3
and T2 (0.69) is precisely estimated and the associated z−ratio shows a value of roughly 2.68.
Column (2) presents the coecients for θ = 300. In line with previous results, the estimates
21suggest that the aggregate compliance rates in T2 and T3 are similar and higher compared to
T1.
4.3.6. Robustness Checks: Summary
Summarizing, all models corroborate the evidence from the linear model: For θ = 100 aggregate
tax compliance in T3 is considerably higher than in T1. Tax compliance is similar in T1 and
T2. Hence, there is an compliance-increasing eect, driven by subjects' imagination with
respect to their own audit probability. For θ = 300 the treatment dummies do not explain
much variation. Recall that all results are obtained from unobserved eects models to control
for heterogeneity of subjects.
5. Conclusion
We analyzed the role of imagination for subjects in a customs compliance framework. Our
experimental results reveal a major asymmetry: A considerable number of subjects behave as
if they consider their deceptive ability to be very low, but there is no evidence of subjects who
behave as if they consider their deceptive ability to be very high.
In a rst set of experiments the subjects decide in compliance frameworks in which they
have monetary incentives to underreport, due to low nes. In one treatment customs ocers
make assessments on the basis of personal communication with face-to-face contact. In this
treatment their appearance or performance inuences which subjects receive an audit. Aggre-
gate compliance behavior is substantially higher (15-20 percentage points) in this treatment
compared to a treatment with a strictly random audit. Using a further control treatment we
can also distinguish between the role of face-to-face contact and the role of customs ocers'
assessment and the formation of subjective beliefs. We nd that higher compliance is driven
by subjective beliefs rather than by face-to-face contact.
In a second set of treatments we provide subjects with monetary incentives to report truth-
fully, due to high nes. In such an environment only those subjects would have incentives to
underreport who believe that they can successfully fool the customs ocer. We do not nd
evidence for such behavior.
In interviews with customs ocers from three international German airports, about 50%
indicated that they consider face-to-face interviews as the most eective strategy to increase
customs compliance. Our experimental evidence is in line with this perception.
Our ndings about the power of imagination have policy relevance not only for the institu-
tional framework of customs declarations. The results are also suggestive for the institutional
set-up of tax declarations and other compliance frameworks more generally: Truthful compli-
ance may possibly be increased if the declarations or reports are made in person and if the
22audit probability for subjects is inuenced by their appearance and performance.
A. Appendix
In this appendix we consider the compliance decision of players with exogenous and with
subjective audit probabilities as a Bayesian game between the subjects with high income, with
other subjects with low income also being present. The framework is as follows. There is a set I
of n players i with a high endowment xH. Also, there are m players who have a low endowment
xL. All players simultaneously make a reporting decision. The report is yi ∈ {l,h}. Players
who declare low endowment may be subject to an audit. For the sake of simplicity, we assume
that the audit itself is not costly for the player who is subject to an audit. The audit reveals
the true endowment of the player with certainty.
Players with low endowment have a strictly dominant strategy: to report low income. There-
fore we truncate their problem here, assuming that they follow this strategy and always report
truthfully. A player i with high endowment either declares high income (yi = h) and pays a
tax T(= 200) and receives a monetary income of xH − T or i declares low income (yi = l). If
a player with high endowment is audited, the underreporting is detected and the player has to
pay the tax T and a ne θ. If the player is not audited, the player enjoys the full income xH.
The treatments we considered in the main part of the paper had dierent mechanisms de-
termining whether a player who declares yi = l receives an audit. In T1 and in the control
treatment T2, there was an exogenously given probability for being audited. This probability
was denoted pi. With the complementary probability (1 − pi), no audit occurs. Accordingly,
the expected monetary payo for player i in T1 and T2 is pi(xH − T − θ) + (1 − pi)xH. For
this exogenous audit probability the decisions of all subjects are fully independent. Subjects
with high endowment choose to report truthfully if xH −T ≥ p(xH −T −θ)+(1−p)xH −∆i,
or, for pi ≡ p = 1/2, they choose to report truthfully if
pT + pθ > T. (3)
In the treatments T1 and T2, this condition was fullled for the high-ne case with θ = 300 and
the reverse condition was fullled for the low-ne case with θ = 100. Even though this is an
almost trivial decision problem with a trivial prediction, it constitutes the status of reference
for the game underlying treatment T3, and this is why we state this as a proposition.
Proposition 1: In T1 and T2, if players are motivated by monetary incentives only, then,
in the equilibrium, all players with high income report truthfully if θ = 300 and underreport if
θ = 100.
23Proposition 1 leads to our auxiliary hypothesis in the main part of the paper. Note that
we do not expect all players to behave strictly in accordance with this prediction. There
are potentially many behavioral reasons why other considerations sometimes dominate the
monetary incentives that drive the behavior in Proposition 1. In particular, some subjects
may be more honest than is predicted by Proposition 1, for instance, because they feel a
mental cost of lying (Lundquist et al. 2009), or they may feel good by paying taxes (Harbaugh
et al. 2007). Some subjects may also underreport even if the monetary incentives suggest that
they report truthfully, for instance, because they may like to gamble, or because they may
enjoy lying. However, if these other attitudes do not interact systematically with the monetary
incentives and if the subjects are all random draws from the same population with these
underlying characteristics, we should observe that more subjects report truthfully if θ = 300
than if θ = 100.
We now turn to the more complex framework underlying T3. We rst give a detailed account
of this treatment. Recall that there are n subjects with high endowment and m subjects with
low endowment. The latter all truthfully report low endowment. The former make a choice.
Accordingly, the reporting decisions lead to a set of players characterized by their endowments
and their reports. This set is {(xH;y1),...,(xH;yn),(xL;l),...,(xL,l)}. The customs ocer has
face-to-face communication with the subjects from this set and observes their reports. A subset
of this set is the set of players who report low income. This subset includes all m subjects
with low endowments, and a subset of the n subjects with high endowments. The customs
ocer solves the task of ranking the subjects. Let (r1,...,rn+m) be the ranking emerging from
this, with r1 being the subject to whom the customs ocer attributes the highest likelihood
of being dishonest, and rn+m the subject which looks most honest among the individuals who
reported yi = l. At this point the computer takes over. It uses the ranking to determine which
subject from this set receives an audit. For this purpose, the computer \cleans" this ranking
from all subjects who, in fact, have low endowments, by dropping these entries from the list,
but preserving the ranking among the subjects who remain on this list. This leads to a reduced
list (ˆ r1,..., ˆ rkn) which consists of kn entries. This reduced list ranks all underreporting subjects
with high endowment. The highest entry ˆ r1 in this list is the subject (xH;yi = l) which in the
eyes of the customs ocer looks most suspicious within this subset. Having computed this list,
the subjects on the upper half of this list receive an audit. If kn is an even number, then the
subjects ˆ r1,..., ˆ rkn/2 on this list are audited, their underreporting is detected, and they pay a
ne equal to θ. If kn is an odd number, then the ((kn−1)/2) subjects ˆ r1,..., ˆ r(kn−1)/2 are audited
with probability 1, and the subject ˆ r(kn+1)/2 receives an audit with an exogenous probability of
1/2. Hence, this procedure makes sure that half of all subjects who are underreporting receive
an audit, are detected and ned. Moreover, this procedure makes sure that the assessment of
the customs ocer sorts all individuals such that the subset of underreporting subjects who
24receive an audit consists of those subjects whom the customs ocer ranks as being more likely
to be underreporting.
For a formal analysis we need to describe what drives players' beliefs about their deceptive
abilities. We assume that the deceptive ability of individuals is an objective characteristic of
subjects, and subjects know their own characteristic, and they know the general distribution of
this characteristic across the population. Let λi ∈ [0,1] measure the player's objective ability
as a liar. That is, a player with λi = 0 has the lowest possible ability, and a player with λi = 1
has the highest possible ability. For each player i, let λi be drawn from the same distribution
with cumulative distribution function F(λ), assuming that F(·) is continuously dierentiable
in the interior of (0,1), has full support and has no mass points. Let the customs ocer also
observe the individual value of λi for each player i who reports low income, and let the ocer
rank the players in an increasing order of their lambdas.22 We can then state the following
property:
Proposition 2: Let there be more than one player who has low endowment. For a given θ,
there exists a critical λ∗ such that all players i with xi = xH with λi ≤ λ∗ report truthfully
and all players i with xi = xH with λi > λ∗ underreport.
For a proof, consider player i who thinks that all other players follow this equilibrium strategy
and conrm that the behavior that is described in Proposition 2 is a best response. Given
the beliefs about other players' behavior as a function of their λj-values and knowing the
distribution from which theses values are drawn, and given player i's own λi, the player can
assess the probability of being audited if the player chooses to underreport. Recall that m
players j who do have low endowment always report yj = l, irrespective of their λj. The





F(λ∗)s(1 − F(λ∗))m−s. (4)







F(λ∗)s(1 − F(λ∗))m−s. (5)
Among the n−1 players with high endowment other than player i, the probability that s of
them underreport is equal to the probability that s of them have a λj ≥ λ∗. This probability
22Note that, by design, the customs ocer is not a fully rational player here, but simply ranks subjects according
to their observed\honest look". The ocer does not solve for how dierent λ feeds back into actual decision-
making in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium with the tax ocer as a player.
25is equal to 
 n − 1
s

F(λ∗)n−1−s(1 − F(λ∗))s. (6)




 n − 1
s

F(λ∗)n−1−s(1 − F(λ∗))s. (7)
Consider now a player whose λi = λ∗. If he underreports, he is not audited if km > m+kn+1
2
and is audited with probability 1 if km < m+kn+1
2 . Note that for λ∗ = 0 the probability that
i with λi = λ∗ is audited is 1: by the assumptions about F, player i ranks at the bottom
of the ranking of the customs ocer with probability 1, and the bottom half of this list is
audited. For λ∗ = 1 the probability that i with λi = λ∗ is audited is zero for m > 1 and n > 1.
To see this note that, for λ∗ = 1, all m players who have low endowment report yj = l; i.e.,
km(λ∗ = 1) = m with probability 1. Moreover, kn(λ∗ = 1) is zero with probability 1, as i is
the only player with such a high λ with probability 1. Accordingly, a player i with λi = 1 will
end up at the top of the ranking. Consider now the eect of an increase in λ∗ starting at
some positive value λ∗. This increase continuously raises the probability that km ≥ s for any
given s = 1,2,3,...,m in a monotonic and continuous manner. For given kn it increases the
probability that the condition km > m+kn+1
2 is fullled. This makes it more likely that a
player with a given λi = λ∗ who reports low income is not audited, for any given number of kn.
Further, an increase in λ∗ reduces the number of underreporting players for any given draw
(λ1,...,λn) of abilities for the set of n−1 high-endowment players other than player i. Hence,
for any given km, an increase in λ∗ makes it more likely that the condition km > m+kn+1
2 holds.
We now denote p(λi;λ∗) the probability that a player with λi who underreports is audited if
λ∗ is the threshold as dened in Proposition 2. This probability is a continuous and (weakly)
monotonically decreasing function in both its arguments, with p(0,0) = 1 and p(1,1) = 0.
Accordingly, there is a λ∗ and an induced p∗ = p(λ∗,λ∗) such that the condition
xH − T = p∗(xH − T − θ) + (1 − p∗)xH (8)
is fullled for one value of λ∗. For this threshold λ∗, high-endowment players with λi = λ∗
are just indierent whether to report truthfully or to underreport. In turn, high-endowment
players with λi > λ∗ prefer to underreport, and high-endowment players with λi < λ∗ prefer
to overreport.
Our main hypotheses A and B follow now as a corollary of Proposition 2. For θ = 100, all
players with a high endowment who make a decision on the basis of their monetary incentives
26choose to underreport in T1 and T2. For T3, the share of players who choose to underreport
is smaller than 100 percent. Similarly, for θ = 300, all players with a high endowment who
make a decision on the basis of their monetary incentives choose to report truthfully in T1
and T2. For T3, there is a range of λ-types who report truthfully and a range of λ-types
who underreport. Accordingly, in expectation, less than 100 percent of all players with high
endowment choose to report truthfully.
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